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Abstract
The lengthy period since the Apollo landings limits present-day engineers attempting to draw
from the experiences of veteran Apollo engineers and astronauts in the design of a new lunar
lander. In order to circumvent these limitations, content analyses were performed on the
voice transcripts of the Apollo lunar landing missions. The analyses highlighted numerous
inefficiencies in the design of the Apollo Lunar Module displays, particularly in the
substantial use of the cognitive resources of the Lunar Module Pilot in the performance of
low-level tasks. The results were used to generate functional and information requirements
for the next-generation lunar lander cockpit.
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Introduction
In January 2004, a new national Vision for Space Exploration was announced that
called for a sustained program of joint robotic and human exploration of the solar system.
The Vision includes a permanent human return to the Moon by 2020 as a stepping stone for
Mars and beyond. The Vision further specifies performance requirements for future lunar
landings that are considerably more ambitious than for previous Apollo missions, and
therefore new spacecraft systems will be needed with advanced capabilities. In particular, the
next-generation lunar lander, currently known as the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM),
must be capable of achieving an autonomous “anytime, anywhere” landing with up to 10 m
precision (Fuhrman et al., 2005). Achieving this will entail not only state-of-the-art avionics
and cockpit display technology, but also rigorous application of modern human factors
principles to optimize the performance of the human as an integral component in the complex
spacecraft system.
A common method for identifying human factors considerations of a proposed system
such as the cockpit of the proposed LSAM is to interview or survey the end-users of similar
vehicles as part of a cognitive task analysis (CTA) (Schraagen, Chipman, & Shalin, 2000).
For example, astronaut input was integral in the proposed Space Shuttle Cockpit Avionics
Upgrade, which addresses the human factors deficiencies of the Shuttle glass cockpit
(McCandless et al., 2005). In the aviation domain, airline pilots have been surveyed to
prioritize their perceived information requirements across different phases of flight, with the
purpose of improving the cockpit layout of future airliners (Schvaneveldt, Beringer, &
Lamonica, 2001).
However, these CTA interview results are susceptible to subjective bias and long-
term memory inaccuracies (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van Breukelen, & Wessel, 2004),
especially if conducted months or years after the event. Furthermore, the possibility of
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conducting interviews about cockpit design of a retired vehicle becomes increasingly difficult
over time as the number of potential interview subjects decreases due to aging and death.
Over thirty years have elapsed since the last human lunar landing in 1972, and now NASA
now faces the undesirable prospect of designing the LSAM without the ability to draw on the
experience of many of the engineers and astronauts who contributed to the Apollo Lunar
Module (LM).
Content analysis of real-time voice or written transcripts has the potential to mitigate
some of the limitations inherent in cognitive task analysis post-hoc interviews or surveys,
especially if subject-matter experts no longer can be interviewed. In content analysis, the
words, phrases, or sentences of transcripts are coded and classified into categories for
statistical analysis (Weber, 1990). Since transcripts are generated from actual events captured
in real-time, they are less likely to be affected by the inaccuracies or biases of post-hoc
interviews.  Furthermore, they are archival and retrievable years after the event regardless of
the availability of the people who actually participated at the time. Content analysis is
therefore particularly suitable for use in a cognitive task analysis for proposed space vehicles
as the voice communications transcripts of human spaceflights, particularly those of the pre-
Shuttle era, have been well documented (Jones, 2006).
Content analysis of voice communications has been used extensively in aviation and
transportation research for numerous purposes. For example, it has been used to determine
the impact of automation on communication and decision-making performance in airline
crews (Cooke et al., 2003; Kanki, Folk, & Irwin, 1991), and to evaluate the use of cockpit
displays of traffic information to maintain pre-defined spacing intervals from other aircraft
(Prinzo, 2003).
In contrast to these previous studies that generally examined workload and
performance through transcript content analysis, this paper proposes the use of content
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analysis to extract functional and information requirements for futuristic LSAM cockpit
design. The generation of accurate and comprehensive functional requirements is critical to
the success of any complex engineering system (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 1998), and only in
recent years has the importance of capturing accurate functional requirements (and derivative
information requirements) from the human perspective been recognized as equally important
as those of mechanical and computational systems (Booher, 2003; Chapanis, 1996).
Moreover, with the increasing complexity of automated systems and the human role as
supervisor of these advanced space systems, the need to identify where, why, how, and when
to support human reasoning, without overwhelming the crew, is particularly critical.
From a historical perspective, the lack of understanding the functional and
information requirements of the crew was nearly catastrophic for Apollo 13. A poorly
designed status display essentially guaranteed that astronauts would not detect the imminent
failure of an oxygen tank, which led to an emergency recovery of the spacecraft (Woods,
1995). Thus it is critical that in the conceptual design phases of complex systems that require
significant human interaction such as the LSAM, that the functional and information
requirements of the crew are identified as early as possible so that they can feed downstream
system design requirements. In this paper, we demonstrate the way in which content analysis
of the Apollo lunar landing mission voice communications generated functional and
information requirements, which contributed to a proposed LSAM cockpit design
(Cummings et al., 2005; Fuhrman et al., 2005).
Methods
Context and Background
The crew of Apollo lunar landing missions consisted of three astronauts: the
Commander (CDR), Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) and Command Module Pilot (CMP). Only
the CDR and LMP flew the Lunar Module to the lunar surface; the CMP remained in lunar
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orbit in the Apollo Command Module. The Capsule Communicator (CapCom) was an
astronaut based at Mission Control in Houston during the mission who acted as the sole
communicator between the flight crew and Mission Control.
Every Lunar landing sequence consisted of three distinct, consecutive phases (Figure
1):
1. Powered Descent Initiation (PDI), an approximately 9 minute phase in which the
Lunar Module decelerated under autopilot control from the 50,000 ft perilune of lunar
descent orbit, with the CDR and LMP holding a human supervisory control role by
monitoring spacecraft systems and mission schedule.
2. Program 64 (P64), in which the Lunar Module pitched over at approximately 6,000
ft altitude to provide the crew with their first view of the landing site. In this approximately
1.5 minute phase, the CDR examined the landscape outside the window to search for
potential landing sites and, if necessary, manually redesignated the eventual landing site
while the computer maintained automatic control of attitude and velocity (Jones, 2006). The
LMP monitored and called out pertinent information from the cockpit instruments to prevent
the CDR from having to look down into the cockpit.
3. Program 66 (P66), in which the CDR assumed manual control of attitude and
descent rate for up to 2.5 minutes to guide the Lunar Module from an altitude of 300-600 ft to
touchdown, while the LMP continued to monitor and call out position and velocity.
Content Analysis
Motivated by both the difficulties in interviewing many subject matter experts and the
inconsistencies in recall from those subject matter experts interviewed (Cummings, et al.
2005), a content analysis was performed with the express purpose of attempting to determine
functional and information requirements to be used in the design of a futuristic lunar lander.
Using the voice transcripts of the six successful Apollo lunar landings (Apollos 11, 12, 14-
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17), a content analysis was performed on the voice communications exchanges spoken by the
CDR, LMP and CapCom during the three landing phases, as described above. Exchanges
spoken by the CMP comprised less than 0.5% of all exchanges throughout this period, and
were thus excluded from the analysis. Once the exchanges were classified (as described
below), relevant statistical tests were applied in order to determine which crewmember role
spoke the most across the three landing phases, as well as which context was the most
important for the different phases.
For each exchange, the speaker (CDR, LMP or CapCom) and the phase in which the
exchange occurred (PDI, P64 or P66) were noted. Each exchange was classified into one of
seven context categories (Table 1). The first four classifications (Schedule, Vehicle/Mission
Status, Vehicle Position, and Off-Nominal) categorized exchanges containing critical
quantitative information, whereas the last three classifications (Personal, Acknowledgment
and Miscommunication) categorized qualitative exchanges. The quantitative categories were
selected since they encompass specific pieces of numerically-based information that
astronauts were seeking in order to maintain the Lunar Module in a safe operating envelope.
However, as in any team environment, a significant portion of Apollo
communications were qualitative, such as clarification of transmissions and social
interactions, so these were also captured. Analysis of quantitative communications can
directly translate into information requirements (e.g., continued requests for altitude data
indicate the need to better present this information to the relevant stakeholder). However,
qualitative communications can also provide insight to the contribution of communications to
overall workload, as well as to discrepancies in shared mental models (i.e., confusion over
specific pieces of information that cause significant discussion). Thus, qualitative
communication content analysis can further elucidate the overall team functions that need to
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be supported, which cannot be gleaned by simple individual quantitative transmission
analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
The classification of exchanges across the seven categories was performed separately
by two individuals with an intra-class correlation of .964. Then, a statistical analysis using the
context categories of Table 1 was performed on the voice exchanges of each crewmember
(CDR, LMP, CapCom) during each phase (PDI, P64, P66), for a total of nine crewmember-
phase combinations.
For each combination of role and phase, the number of exchanges by context was
analyzed using the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, since the majority of data violated the
normality and homoscedasticity assumptions of parametric tests. Mann-Whitney U tests were
then performed to compare significant Kruskal-Wallis results. A total of 895 voice exchanges
across the six Apollo lunar landing missions were analyzed (Figure 2). In all cases, α = 0.05,
unless otherwise stated.
Results
The content analysis was initially performed in two ways. First, the absolute number
of exchanges for each phase-crewmember combination was analyzed without accounting for
the differences in phase duration across the six different Apollo missions. The analysis was
then repeated with the number of exchanges normalized to account for the variation in phase
duration across different missions, phases, and crew. The two methods yielded very similar
results: 94% of the Kruskal-Wallis rankings calculated using the absolute data were identical
to those from normalized data. Even in the 6% of cases where rankings were not identical,
the difference between the results for the two data sets was minor in that only two context
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categories either switched adjacent rankings (e.g., from 2nd and 3rd to 3rd and 2nd) or had
equal rankings instead of ordered rankings (e.g., both equal to 5th instead of 5th and 6th).
Furthermore, the rate at which voice communications occurred, measured in number of
exchanges per minute, was not significantly different across phases (Kruskal-Wallis p =
0.166), nor across missions (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.623). As such, only results from the
absolute data are presented hereafter.
During PDI
Crewmember role was significant (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.021), driven primarily by the
CapCom’s significantly reduced communication role. The CapCom spoke less frequently
than the CDR and LMP (24%, or 144 out of 594 exchanges, Mann-Whitney p < 0.026 for all
pairwise comparisons between the CapCom and other crewmembers; Figure 3a). In contrast,
the frequency with which the CDR spoke was not significantly different from that of the
LMP.
Pairwise context categories comparisons were then conducted for each of the three
crewmember roles to determine dominant categories. The top three statistically significant
context categories (as compared to the other contexts) for each crewmember across each
phase are shown in Table 2 (if less than three categories are listed, only those that showed a
statistical difference are included). In the PDI phase, the CDR discussed Vehicle/Mission
Status significantly more frequently than any other context (Mann-Whitney p = 0.04
compared to Schedule, the second most frequently discussed context which was not
statistically different from the remaining categories). The LMP discussed Vehicle/Mission
Status, Vehicle Position, and Schedule significantly more frequently than other contexts
(Mann-Whitney p = 0.041 between Schedule and Personal, the third and fourth most frequent
contexts; Table 2). The most important contexts for the CapCom were Schedule (35% of all
CapCom exchanges), Acknowledgment (30%) and Vehicle/Mission Status (18%). These
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were marginally more significant than other contexts (Mann-Whitney p = 0.093 between
Vehicle/Mission Status and Vehicle Position, the third and fourth most frequently discussed
contexts respectively.)
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
During P64
As in the PDI phase, crewmember role significantly influenced the communication
frequency (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.007). The CapCom spoke significantly less frequently than
either the CDR or LMP (11%, or 17 out of 155 exchanges, Mann-Whitney p < 0.009 for all
pairwise comparisons between CapCom and other crewmembers; Figure 3b). As in the PDI
stage, the frequency with which the CDR spoke was not significantly different from that of
the LMP.
Within the context categories, the CDR discussed Vehicle Position, Personal,
Acknowledgment, and Vehicle/Mission Status more frequently than other contexts (Kruskal-
Wallis p = 0.001), but there was no significant difference in the pairwise frequencies of these
four contexts (thus they were all discussed with the same frequency). In contrast, the LMP
discussed Vehicle Position significantly more frequently than any other contexts (Kruskal-
Wallis p = 0.002, Mann-Whitney p = 0.002 compared to Personal, the second most frequent
context). The CapCom discussed Schedule and Acknowledgment more frequently than other
contexts (Kruskal-Wallis p < 0.0005) except Off-Nominal, which was marginally significant
(Mann Whitney comparison between Off-Nominal and Acknowledgment, p < 0.093; between
Off-Nominal and Schedule p = 0.009).
During P66
Crewmember communications were significant across the P66 phase (Kruskal-Wallis
p = 0.001), with the LMP speaking significantly more frequently (64%, or 94 out of 146
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exchanges, Figure 3c) than both the CDR (Mann-Whitney p = 0.015) and the CapCom
(Mann-Whitney p = 0.002).
As seen in Table 2, the most important contexts for the CDR were Vehicle/Mission
Status (1st), Vehicle Position (2nd) and Acknowledgment (3rd) but these were only
marginally more frequent than the other four contexts (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.008; Mann-
Whitney p = 0.093 between Vehicle/Mission Status and Schedule, the fourth most frequent
context). In contrast, the LMP discussed two contexts significantly more than others
(Kruskal-Wallis p < 0.0005): Vehicle Position (Mann-Whitney p = 0.026 compared to
Vehicle/Mission Status, the second most frequent context) and Vehicle/Mission Status
(Mann-Whitney p = 0.004 compared to Personal, the third most frequent context). The
CapCom discussed Acknowledgment, Schedule and Vehicle/Mission Status significantly
more frequently than other contexts (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.049) except for Off-Nominal
(Mann-Whitney p = 0.18 compared to Acknowledgment, the most frequent context).
The Most Predominant Context Categories
Inspection of Table 2 shows that of the originally identified seven categories,
Vehicle/Mission Status, Vehicle Position, Acknowledgment, and Schedule accounted for the
majority of the communications. Of particular note, three of these four categories represent
quantitative categories, i.e., they include numeric information that the crew was seeking from
the displays in order to maintain the lander in a safe operating envelope. Given that the
acknowledgement category did not represent the conveyance of display-specific information,
the other three most commonly occurring categories were examined more closely to discern
any statistically significant trends.
Analysis of these three most predominant display-specific contexts (Vehicle/Mission
Status, Schedule, and Vehicle Position) across the PDI phase showed that the CDR and LMP
discussed Vehicle/Mission Status significantly more frequently than the CapCom (Kruskal-
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Wallis p = 0.004, Mann-Whitney p < 0.004 for all pairwise comparisons between CapCom
and other crewmembers). The LMP discussed Vehicle Position significantly more frequently
than the CDR and CapCom (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.003, Mann-Whitney p < 0.041 for all
pairwise comparisons between LMP and other crewmembers. In contrast, there was no
significant difference in the frequency with which the three personnel discussed Schedule.
These rankings are represented in Table 3.
For P64, across the crewmembers, the CapCom discussed Schedule marginally more
frequently than the CDR or LMP (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.052, Mann-Whitney p < 0.093 for all
pairwise comparisons between CapCom and other crewmembers.) The CDR discussed
Vehicle/Mission Status marginally more frequently than the LMP or CapCom (Kruskal-
Wallis p = 0.005, Mann-Whitney p < 0.132 for all pairwise comparisons between CDR and
other crewmembers). The LMP discussed Vehicle Position significantly more frequently than
the CDR or CapCom (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.001, Mann-Whitney p < 0.026 for all pairwise
comparisons between LMP and other crewmembers, Figure 3b and Table 3).
For P66, the CDR and LMP discussed Vehicle/Mission Status significantly more
frequently than the CapCom (Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.008, Mann-Whitney p < 0.041 for all
pairwise comparisons between CapCom and other crewmembers). As with P64, the LMP
discussed Vehicle Position significantly more frequently than the CDR or CapCom (Kruskal-
Wallis p = 0.001, Mann-Whitney p < 0.004 for all pairwise comparisons between LMP and
other crewmembers, Figure 3c). As in the PDI phase, there was no significant difference in
the frequency with which the three individuals discussed Schedule (Table 3).
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
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Discussion
This content analysis demonstrates that the context and frequency of the voice
communications during the critical final minutes of the Apollo lunar descent and landing
varied considerably by both crewmember and phase. It also demonstrates some consistent
trends suggesting that changing future roles and function allocation could increase the
efficiency and safety of precision landings in future vehicles.
During PDI and P66, the CDR and LMP both held a supervisory control role,
primarily monitoring Vehicle/Mission Status. This suggests some redundancy in role
allocation, and the content analysis reflects this by illustrating that the communications of the
CDR and LMP were relatively similar in context and frequency (Figures 3a and 3c).
However, one striking difference between the CDR and the LMP can be seen in Table 3,
which demonstrates that across all three phases, the LMP held a vehicle position monitoring
and callout role to support the CDR, who was assuming cognitively demanding, perceptually-
based manual control of the spacecraft. The content analysis correspondingly shows that 71%
of the LMP’s exchanges in the higher workload P64 and P66 phases served the primary
purpose of informing the CDR of Vehicle Position information, particularly altitude, descent
rate, and projected landing site. During these final two phases, the CapCom (representing
Mission Control) could not assist the crew in performing the critical task of finding a landing
site, but did assist in reminding the crew of the planned Schedule.
Eliminating the necessity to call out cockpit information on the part of the LMP
would thus considerably liberate the cognitive resources of the LMP. Moreover, as can be
seen in Figure 3 and Table 2, the CDR incurred additional workload by having to
acknowledge the LMP callouts, particularly in the highest workload phase of P66. This
communication and cognitive overhead would disappear if cockpit information could be
directly perceived by the CDR. Today, a head-up or helmet-mounted display could provide
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this capability by projecting cockpit information into the CDR’s field of view. Unfortunately,
this technology was not available during the time of Apollo, but a new precision landing
head-up-display has been proposed to meet this need (Smith, Cummings, Forest, & Kessler,
2006), due in part to the findings of this study.
The content analysis also emphasizes that the CapCom’s role was primarily to remind
the crew of Schedule and to a lesser degree, Vehicle/Mission Status. This responsibility
diminished as the descent and landing progressed. This reduction occurred not only because
the CapCom spoke significantly less frequently than the flight crew, but also because many
of the CapCom’s exchanges were merely Acknowledgments to exchanges from the crew.
Modern technology could provide the capability to automate the reminder functions, thus
liberating the cognitive resources of the CapCom as well as the space-to-ground voice
telemetry channels for higher level human supervisory control and mission management
purposes. While the need for acknowledgment of communications is critical in any team
environment to build and maintain shared situation awareness, it also introduces a cognitive
overhead cost which could be eliminated if unnecessary communications between human
team members were also eliminated.
While Table 2 demonstrates that the most frequent communications were based either
on the need for specific quantitative display information or the need for acknowledgment,
there was one qualitative context category that showed significance out of the top three
context categories: Personal communication for the CDR in P64. Closer analysis of the
transcripts revealed that the increase in CDR Personal communications during P64 occurred
because the Lunar Module pitched over at the beginning of this phase to provide the CDR
with his first view of the landing area. Several CDRs made repeated comments expressing
their excitement about this initial view, and its similarity to pre-flight simulations. Given this
trend across all the missions analyzed, one possible design outcome could be that as little
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information as possible should be conveyed at this transition point since it is an expected (and
important) experience that could be distracting for a brief period of time.
Cockpit Design Implications
The role of the crew is central in the design of a manned (as well as an autonomous,
unmanned) lunar lander because of the difficulties in maintaining situation awareness through
remote displays. Why, when, and where the human contributes to a mission is inherently
linked to the functional and design requirements. Moreover, which functions or subsets of
functions should be allocated to humans and what should be allocated to automation remains
a difficult design challenge for both space and aviation systems. The function allocation
dilemma was one that Apollo engineers struggled with, as they debated whether to design a
highly automated vehicle, requiring little reasoning or decision making on the part of the
astronauts, or one with significant human input, which could result in a large number of
tasks, resulting in possibly high mental and physical workload. This conundrum still exists
today.
The resulting Apollo designs were largely driven by the technology available at that
time, which resulted in very cumbersome, high workload displays that generally did not
account for human cognitive needs. However, present-day technologies can and should be
more accommodating to human cognition requirements, especially in light of the lessons
learned from formalized cognitive systems engineering processes, which were not in
existence at the time of Apollo. One of these formalized processes is the explicit development
of functional and resultant display design requirements that support the human’s role in the
overall mission. While the establishment of functional and design requirements for complex
systems is an established systems engineering methodology (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 1998), it
has only been recognized in recent years that such a formal analytic approach should also be
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taken for the human-systems integration aspect (Booher, 2003; Chapanis, 1996), thus treating
the human need for cognitive support as important as any other subsystem.
To this end in terms of designing the next generation lunar lander, this content
analysis aided in identifying critical functional and display information requirements during
the landing sequence by quantifying the context and frequency of voice communications
during the actual Apollo lunar landing missions. In addition, this analysis provided important
role allocation information for the astronauts and CapCom, and how they contributed to the
overall functions of the mission. More specifically, this context analysis contributed to the
development of the following functional requirements (Cummings, et al., 2005):
• Astronauts/controllers should be constantly aware of vehicle endurance and
position, both in time and space. The content analysis clearly demonstrated the 
constant need for vehicle/mission status updates, as well as vehicle position across all 
three phases.
• Software agents (e.g., on-screen smart checklists) must be provided to reduce
astronaut/controller cognitive workload. Since so much of the communication 
involved discussions and acknowledgements about the schedule, automated 
scheduling tools, the use of smart checklists could alleviate the human need to 
constantly remind the crew since contextual, event-driven reminders could be 
automated.
• Provide advanced visualization tools (i.e., synthetic and predictive views) to
enhance astronaut/controller situation awareness and reduce cognitive overhead. The
content analysis demonstrated the LMP’s role as a human instantiation of a head-up
display, which resulted in increased communication acknowledgment overhead for 
the CDR, who was actually controlling the lander. This could be alleviated by 
providing the required information directly to the CDR, instead of filtering it through 
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the LMP. While this type of display would eliminate the need for the LMP in this 
phase for this task, this crewmember could then focus on other tasks such as the 
vehicle status and schedule monitoring, which would alleviate the need for such a 
close link to Mission Control (which will be discussed more in-depth in a subsequent 
section.)
• On-demand information access and sharing among crew members and mission
Controllers. This design intervention could further reduce the communication 
overhead imposed by the redundant communications between all three team members,
as well as reduce the acknowledgement communications.
The resulting functional and design requirements led to the proposed design of a
windowless cockpit for a future lunar lander consisting of three integrated synthetic displays
(Cummings et al., 2005), discussed below (Figure 4):
1. Landing Zone display for visualizing the landing site and supervising the system’s 
conduct of an automatic precision landing. This display also provides for manual 
intervention if necessary (Figure 4a).
2. Situation Awareness display for understanding vehicle position in both space and 
time, as well as in the sequence and schedule of events (Figure 4b).
3. System Status display for monitoring the vehicle systems in the event of an urgent 
or emergent condition that could threaten the safety of the lander during the landing 
sequence, as well as cause problems in the mission plan (Figure 4c).
The Landing Zone display was primarily developed to meet the advanced
visualizations functional requirement, specified above. As seen in the content analysis, the
primary role of the LMP during P64 and P66 was to call out cockpit information to the CDR
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as he focused his attention on the landscape outside the window. The proposed display in
Figure 4a effectively eliminates the primary role of the LMP during these phases by
integrating the outside view and critical landing information such that all of the information
can be directly perceived by the crewmember responsible for choosing the landing site.
In terms of role and function allocation, as demonstrated in this content analysis, the
CapCom’s role in the landing sequence was relatively minor, particularly in the P64 and P66
stages. It primarily consisted of schedule reminders and acknowledgments to transmissions
originating from the Lunar Module. The proposed Situation Awareness display (and the
associated automation) provides this information to the crew in a manner that can be directly
perceived and comprehended potentially more quickly than through voice communication,
thus eliminating the need for the CapCom for schedule reminders. During the Apollo
missions, the role of Mission Control during nominal operations was to provide information
that could not be displayed onboard the Lunar Module due to both human and system
limitations. For future missions, however, the eventual goal should be to become completely
independent of Mission Control in order to enable decision-making to occur onboard the
spacecraft. This ability to conduct operations without the link to Mission Control will be
especially critical for deep-space missions where real-time voice communications may be
unfeasible.
While the CapCom’s (and thus Mission Control’s) role during nominal landings was
minimal, this analysis demonstrated that under off-nominal situations (i.e., when problems
arise), Mission Control played a more central role. Thus, independence from Mission Control
will only become possible through significant advances in health and status monitoring,
particularly under off-nominal conditions. However, even in the present Space Shuttle
displays which take on a greater degree of autonomy than Apollo missions, difficulties in
using the Space Shuttle cockpit displays to identify and diagnose off-nominal situations have
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been documented (McCandless et al., 2005). In order to overcome these Apollo and Shuttle
limitations, the System Status display of the proposed cockpit (Figure 4c) proposes a
collaborative human-computer approach to health and status monitoring much like the
astronaut-Mission Control relationship in the Apollo missions. Such an advanced, automated
system would rely heavily on a significantly improved sensor suite as well as significant
advances in predictive algorithms and software reliability.
Unlike the Apollo Lunar Module cockpit, which primarily consisted of
electromechanical gauges, this suite of displays integrates landing information, system state
information relative to position and time, and system status information. Since information
within these three classifications is required to simultaneously conduct the supervisory
control landing sequence, their perceptual proximity in a glass cockpit environment allows
the information to be processed in parallel. Furthermore, such integrated displays have the
potential to provide supra-normal acuity, wide field of view and reconfigurability for
different flight phases and personal preferences.
However, such an advanced and futuristic design concept that dramatically changes
the human-automation role allocation over that seen in Apollo could be controversial
(Reichhardt, 2006). It is not uncommon for such advanced supervisory control systems,
which represent a significant organizational and cultural paradigm shift, to meet some
resistance, particularly when the importance of the human role could be seen as diminished
(Sheridan, 2002). However, if NASA is going to achieve manned deep-space missions, or
even landing on the dark side of the moon, such advanced supervisory control systems that
reduce the reliance on Mission Control will be critical.
Conclusion
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As with all content analysis studies, this study is subject to a number of limitations.
This content analysis provided limited insight into the workload or performance of the Apollo
astronauts as there were no obvious metrics against which the results of the content analysis
could be correlated. Previous content analysis studies in aerospace domains have used
number of aircraft as a proxy for air traffic controller workload (Prinzo, 2003) and deviation
from altitude, course, or time as a proxy for airline pilot performance (Cooke et al., 2003),
but there are no analogous metrics for the Apollo lunar landings. Furthermore, it was difficult
to subjectively estimate workload or performance by reading the transcripts. Several Apollo
Commanders have cited P66 to be the most challenging phase of the landing (Cummings et
al., 2005; Jones, 2006) but the context, tone and speech rate of their exchanges provide no
direct indication of this. The fact that the CDR spoke significantly less frequently than the
LMP only during the final P66 phase, but not during P64 or PDI, is only an indirect reflection
of the CDR’s high workload during this period.
While one advantage of using such a method is the ability to retrospectively capture
cognitive functional and information requirements when subjects matter experts are no longer
accessible, one question that such an analysis raises is whether the content analysis of such an
older, less complex system can effectively contribute to a new, much more capable system?
Such an analysis would really only be useful if the functional requirements for the older and
newer systems are very similar, which is the case for the new lunar lander design.  Despite
the fact that proposed landings on the moon will occur 50 or more years after the initial
landings, functionally the missions are nearly identical (Fuhrman et al, 2005). Both then and
now, the displays must allow the crew the ability to monitor the status and position of the
vehicle, track the mission progress, check it against the schedule, effect a safe landing, and
respond to off-nominal problems. While these functions are identical between Apollo and the
proposed lunar landings, which is why the content analysis of the Apollo transcripts is
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relevant, one significant change for the future will be the increasing application of
supervisory control through advanced automation. However, as discussed previously, the use
of more automation only changes the functional allocation, not the functions themselves.
In conclusion, the present study demonstrated the potential for content analysis to lead
to human-automation design concepts through the generation of functional and information
requirements, as exemplified through the analysis of voice transcripts of previous lunar
landings which motivated the design of a futuristic lunar lander. As discussed previously, this
application of content analysis to inform futuristic system design is valuable particularly
when access to subject matter experts is limited or impossible, but is limited to those cases
where the systems’ functions have not changed in any significant manner. If system functions
do not appreciably change between evolutionary (or even revolutionary) designs, this method
could be applicable for generating requirements and improving the design of displays in a
wide range of aviation fields, including military, space, and commercial applications.
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Table 1
Definition of Context Categories and Examples of Categorical Classification Exchanges
Context Definition Example
Schedule Mission schedule, timing “Falcon, Houston. You’re
Go at 2 minutes”
Vehicle / Mission
Status
Status of spacecraft systems “We’re reading 87 and 85 in
the fuel quantity”
Vehicle Position Vehicle position, velocity or
acceleration
“Altitude 4000 high. H-dot
about 9 high”
Off-Nominal Alarms or other emergency situations “1201 alarm”
Miscommunication Announcement of, and attempts to
rectify, poor communications signals
“We’ve lost them. Tell them
to go Aft Omni”
Acknowledgment Reply to confirm that another





“It’s beautiful out here!”
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Table 2
Top Three Significant Context Categories by Crewmember and Phase
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Table 3
Vehicle/Mission Status, Schedule, and Vehicle Position Communication Frequency
Phase Vehicle/Mission Status Schedule Vehicle Position
PDI CDR = LMP CDR = LMP = CapCom LMP
P64 CDR CapCom LMP
P66 CDR = LMP CDR = LMP = CapCom LMP
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The Apollo three phase landing sequence
Figure 2. Number of exchanges by Phase and Crewmember across the six Apollo lunar
landing missions.
Figure 3. Exchange context by crewmember during (a) PDI, (b) P64, (c) P66, across the six
Apollo lunar landing missions.
Figure 4. Proposed lunar lander displays: (a) Landing Zone, (b) Situation Awareness, (c)
System Status.




















(Note: this Figure is intended to cover only 1 column in a 2-column page.)
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218 144232 Total Exchanges
                                                                             Developing Lunar Access   31
Figure 4
(Note: Figure will cover 2 columns in a 2-column page.)
